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Many countries use tax revenues to subsidize private schools. Whether these policies meet social
objectives depends, in part, on the relative quality of education provided by the two types of schools.
We use data on elementary school students and their teachers in Bogotáá, Colombia to examine
difference in resource mixes and differences in the relative effectiveness of public and private
schools. We find that, on average, the schools in the two sectors are equally effective. However, they
produce education using very different resource combinations. Moreover, there are large differences
in the effectiveness of schools in both sectors, especially in the private sector. The results of our
analysis shed light on the quantity-quality tradeoff that governments in many developing countries
face in deciding how to use scarce educational resources.
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Expanding School Enrollment by Subsidizing Private Schools:  
Lessons from Bogotá 
 
I.  Introduction 
In many countries, government policies that use tax revenues to pay all or part of 
the cost of educating children in private schools have blurred the distinction between 
public and private schools. For example, Chile and New Zealand have implemented 
educational voucher programs to stimulate competition among schools.
1  The government 
of the Netherlands pays the costs of educating children at schools run by religious 
organizations.
2  Recently, some countries have introduced policies of subsidizing private 
schools as a way of increasing supply.
3  For example, the city of Bogotá in Colombia 
subsidizes private schools that enroll low-income students, as part of a strategy to meet 
its commitment to universal access to primary schooling.  
Underlying these private sector strategies is the assumption that participating 
private schools will provide a quality education to their students, and will do so without 
                                                 
1   Edward B. Fiske and Helen F. Ladd, When schools compete: A cautionary tale (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 2000); Chang-Tai Hsieh and Miguel Urquiola, “When Schools Compete, How Do They 
Compete? An Assessment of Chile’s Nationwide School Voucher Program,” National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 10008 (October 2003). 
2   Estelle James, “Public Subsidies for Private and Public Education: The Dutch Case.” In Private 
Education: Studies in Choice and Public Policy, ed. D.C. Levy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
3   Indeed, Estelle James (“Why Do Different Countries Choose a Different Public-Private Mix of 
Educational Services?” Journal of Human Resources 28 (Summer 1993): 571-592) finds that countries 







    
reducing the quality of public schools.
4  Understanding whether this assumption is valid 
requires investigation of the manner in which public schools and private schools 
“produce” student achievement, especially because, in many settings, the student body 
composition, teacher characteristics, and class sizes of public schools and private schools 
differ markedly.
5  If these factors play a role in determining children’s skills, then these 
differences may compromise the success of “private sector” strategies in providing a 
high-quality education to the children they are meant to help.   
Understanding the effects of teacher quality, class size, and peer group 
composition on school success is relevant to the design of public policies regarding the 
rules under which private schools operate.  For example, the larger the role of peer group 
composition in determining students’ achievement, the more important it is to design 
public policies that prevent the concentration of low income children in particular 
schools.  
Disentangling the relative contributions of class size, peer group, and teacher 
quality is not possible in typical data sets in which each teacher works with only one 
group of children.  In this study, however, we make use of an unusual property of a 
dataset from Bogotá –  some teachers teach math to more than one classroom of students 
– to estimate the roles of teacher quality, peer groups, and class size.   Because students 
appear to be randomly assigned to these classrooms, we can identify the effects of class 
                                                 
4    There is some evidence that private schools are more cost-effective than private schools.  For example, 
using data from Indonesia, Estelle James, Elizabeth M. King, and Ace Suryadi (“Finance, 
Management, and Costs of Public and Private Schools in Indonesia,” Economics of Education Review 
15 (October 1996): 387-398) find that the cost per student of achieving a given level of academic 







    
size and peers by comparing student achievement across classrooms taught by the same 
teacher.  In these analyses, we obtain unbiased estimates of the causal effects of these 
classroom characteristics on student mathematics achievement by fitting statistical 
models that include teacher fixed effects.    Also, we implement a new methodology 
based on excess variance contrasts to estimate the impact of peer group composition on 
student mathematics achievement.  Finally, we fit an additional series of statistical 
models in which classrooms are treated as random effects to examine the extent to which 
differences between the public and private sectors in teacher quality, class size, and peer 
composition explain differences in the mathematics achievement of students in the two 
sectors.  
Our results show that teacher quality, peer groups, and class size all influence 
student achievement.  We also show that the average attributes of public schools and 
private schools differ markedly in dimensions that affect student achievement.  Finally 
we show that differences in student achievement among schools in the public sector, and 
especially among schools in the private sector, are much larger than the average 
difference between the achievement of children attending public schools and those 
attending private schools, net of family background influences.  The implication for 
parents is that the decision to use public or private schools is much less important than 
the choice of school within either sector.  The implication for governments is that the 
details of subsidy programs are extremely important.   
Section 2 provides a brief summary of Bogotá’s recent strategy of subsidizing 
                                                                                                                                                 
5   Patrick McEwan & Martin Carnoy, “The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Private Schools in Chile’s 







    
private schools.  Section 3 discusses previous research on the effects of class size, peers, 
and teacher characteristics, particularly in Latin America.  We focus on studies that have 
used the most plausible research designs.  Section 4 presents the data, sample, measures 
and analytical strategies that we use to answer our research questions.  Section 5 presents 
our findings, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of these 
findings for school policy in Bogotá, and in other countries that provide public funds to 
private schools. 
 
II.  The Bogotá Setting 
Since the 1950s, Bogotá has experienced a six-fold growth in population as 
migrants have streamed into the city in search of better economic opportunities or a 
refuge from the armed conflict that has ravaged large parts of the country.  Providing  
access to schooling for the growing population has been a major challenge for the 
Bogotá government.  In 1997 when a new mayoral administration came into office, it 
found that more that 140,000 children in the city from the lowest income level were not 
attending school. Of those students from low income families who were in school, close 
to one third were enrolled in private unsubsidized schools of dubious quality.
6  
Committed to providing access to publicly funded schooling for all school-aged 
children, the Department of Education (Secretaría de Educación del Districto—SED) has 
used a two-pronged strategy to meet the demand for primary schooling.  One prong is 
expansion of the public sector, by increasing class sizes,
7 reassigning teachers from 
                                                 
6   SED, Informe de Gestión : 1998-2000  (Bogotá D.C.: Secretaría de Educación, Alcaldía Mayor,  
2000). 







    
administrative posts to classrooms, and constructing or rehabilitating classrooms in run-
down schools.  A related policy is to give students from low income families preferential 
access to the limited number of places available in public schools. 
The second prong is subsidizing private schools that enroll low income students.  
As a result, in the year 2000, 53 percent of students in the city were enrolled in the city’s 
2,900 private schools.
8  For-profit schools, typically started by individuals, constitute 90 
percent of all private schools in the city.  The second most common type are religious 
schools, which make up 8 percent of the total, and are usually either subsidized or 
“contracted” by the government to provide educational services in low income areas. 
Finally, cooperative schools are established by neighborhood organizations typically in 
areas of unmet demand. They derive funding from both tuitions and public subsidies.  
Public and private school sectors in Bogotá differ in a number of ways, 
particularly with respect to student composition, teacher qualifications, and class size.  
Consequently, even though SED’s strategy of subsidizing private schools may have 
increased access to primary schooling in the city, the schooling experiences of low-
income students attending schools in the two sectors may be quite different.   
Private schools in Bogotá can set their own student admission policies, which are 
mostly based on academic criteria and/or on families’ ability to pay.
9  Although private 
                                                 
8   In comparison, only 21 percent of all pre-university level students in the country were enrolled in 
private schools in the same year, from SED, Boletin Estadístico. Versión Borrador (Bogotá, Colombia: 
Secretaría de Educación Distrital, 2001).    
9   The yearly tuition fee for private schools in Bogotá in the 2002 school-year ranged from $30 to $2,400, 
with an average of $285 (SED, Estadísticas Educativas, 1998-2003 (Bogotá, Colombia: Secretaría de 
Educación Distrital, 2003).  This is considerably less than the $439 average expenditure per student in 
public schools.  However, these figures are not completely comparable because the public sector 
expenditure figure includes the costs of school supplies, transportation, and nutritional supplement, 







    
schools in Bogotá enroll students from the whole range of the socio-economic spectrum, 
on average they serve a more affluent segment of the population than do public schools.  
For example, 43 percent of the private schools in our sample primarily enroll students 
from the lowest two (of six) socio-economic strata
10 while 10 percent primarily enroll 
students from the highest three strata.  In comparison, 75 percent of public schools in our 
sample primarily enroll students from the lowest two strata, and none primarily enrolls 
students from the upper income strata.
  
Public and private schools also differ in the characteristics of their teachers.  Most 
public primary school teachers in Bogotá have four-year degrees in education and post-
graduate training.
11  As a result of relatively low turnover (3 percent annually) among 
Bogotá public school teachers and restrictions on the opening of new teaching posts in 
the public sector, the public school teaching force is mostly middle-aged and 
experienced, and relatively costly.
12  In contrast, private school teachers in Bogotá have 
much less teaching experience and fewer formal educational credentials than public 
school teachers.
13  
There are three complementary explanations for these differences.  First, as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
activities and expect parents to make “voluntary” donations (bonos).   
10   Bogotá has a six-level system of socio-economic stratification, with 6 as the highest and 1 as the 
lowest. Roughly, estrato 1 and 2 correspond to families earning up to two times the minimum wage 
(the 2003 minimum wage is approximately US$100/month). Estrato 4 and 5 families earn 
approximately between 5 to 10 times the minimum wage.  
11   Based on data from A. Sarmiento, B. L. Caro, J. I. González, E. Castaño, E., and J. Espinosa, 
Evaluación de la Calidad de la Educación Primaria en Santa Fé de Bogotá 1998, Factores Asociados 
al Logro, Informe Final Versión Definitiva (Santa Fé de Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, Secretaría de Educación de Bogotá, Corporación Mixta para el Desarrollo de la Educación 
Básica, 1999).   
12   New regulations that came into effect in 2002 introduce performance accountability mechanisms for 
promotions and reduce the weight of academic credentials and experience in determining promotions.  
These changes are likely to bring about changes in the city’s teaching force over the coming years.  







    
result of a 1995 constitutional court ruling, private schools are required to pay teachers 
according to the public teacher salary scale that rewards experience and educational 
credentials.
14 However, private schools have greater flexibility than public schools in 
hiring teachers with modest credentials and in dismissing teachers at will.  Consequently 
private schools have more control of personnel costs than do public schools.  Second, in 
recent years a weak economy has made it difficult for many private schools to collect 
tuition payments and has created great pressure to reduce operating costs. Third, 
government regulations restrict the rate of private school tuition increases to the rate of 
inflation. 
There are a number of concerns about the impact that the recent reforms aimed at 
increasing access have had on the quality of education provided to students.  One stems 
from the increase in class sizes in public sector schools.  A second is that schools may be 
becoming more segregated by socioeconomic status as students from the lowest income 
groups are given preferential assignment to public and private subsidized schools, leaving 
middle class children to attend unsubsidized private schools.  A third is that as the city 
increases its subsidies program, some private schools accustomed to serving a relatively 
affluent population are increasingly serving children from low income families.  Serving 
these children poses new challenges that are difficult to meet, especially by schools that 
contain costs by hiring as teachers adults with little pedagogical training or teaching 
experience.   
If class size, peer groups, and teacher qualifications affect student achievement, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Educación en Colombia,” Planeación y Desarrollo 32 (Autumn 2001): 339-386. 







    
these reforms may jeopardize quality in both sectors.   This provides our motivation for 
examining the effects that these factors have on student achievement and the roles they 
play in explaining the relative effectiveness of public and private schools.  These issues 
are important not only to Bogotá, but also to other countries and cities that subsidize their 
private schools.   
Before describing our approach to answering these questions, we review research 
from other countries.  We limit our review to studies that have employed compelling 
strategies for estimating the unbiased causal impacts of class size, peers, and teacher 
quality on student achievement, and the relative effectiveness of public and private 
schools. 
 
III.  Prior Research 
A substantial literature examines the effects of class size, peer effects, and teacher 
quality on student achievement, both in the US and in developing countries.
15  Most 
studies are problematic, however, because they lack compelling strategies to account for 
the non-random assignment of teachers and students to classrooms.  For instance, most 
studies of the effects of class size on student achievement do not adequately account for 
the assignment of weaker students (or stronger students) to the smallest classes.  As a 
result the estimates of class size effects are likely to be biased.  Similarly, it is likely that 
highly motivated parents choose their child’s school based on the characteristics of its 
students.  Consequently, in many studies, estimates of peer group effects may be biased 







    
motivation on children’s achievement.  Following this same logic, if more able students 
(or less able students) are assigned to better teachers, then the application of conventional 
methods will result in biased estimates of the effects of teacher characteristics on student 
achievement.   
  It follows that a powerful strategy for obtaining unbiased estimates of the causal 
effects of class size, peers, and teacher characteristics on achievement is to randomly 
assign teachers and students to classrooms.  Randomized controlled trials are expensive, 
however, and remain few in number.
16  The next best alternative is to learn from “natural 
experiments” in which policies or policy changes create exogenous variation in the 
assignment of students to classrooms. 
Miguel Urquiola,
17 for example, estimates the effects of class size by exploiting 
the results of a policy rule in Bolivia: when class enrollment size reaches 30 students, a 
school can apply to the Ministry of Education for another teacher, such that in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15   For an older review of research in developing countries, see Bruce Fuller, “What School Factors Raise 
Achievement in the Third World?” Review of Educational Research 57 (Autumn 1987): 255-292.   
16   The best known class size experiment is Project STAR in Tennessee.  See A.B. Krueger, 
“Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 
(May 1999): 497-532.  In terms of peer effects, the Moving to Opportunity project randomly awards 
housing vouchers to residents of low-income neighborhoods in various cities in the US.  For results 
from Boston, see Lawrence F. Katz, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Moving to Opportunity 
in Boston: Early Results from a Randomized Mobility Experiment,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 
116 (May 2001): 607-654.  The effects of peers in tertiary education have been evaluated using 
random assignments of students to college dorms or rooms within dorms (e.g. Bruce Sacerdote, “Peer 
Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116 (May 2001): 681-704.).  The one random assignment experiment on teacher quality 
that we are aware of finds that Teach for America participants are somewhat more effective in teaching 
math (but not reading) to low-income children than the other teachers serving in these schools.  See  
Paul Decker, Daniel Mayer, and Steven Glazerman, The Effects of Teach for America on Students: 
Evidence from a National Evaluation (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, June 2004). One 
other relevant random assignment study finds that tutors have a large positive impact on the 
achievement of low-income students (see Abhijit Banerjee, Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, and Lee 
Linden, “Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India,” MIT 







    
following year there will be an additional classroom, and both will have fewer students.    
The characteristics of students in class sizes of 30 should be equal on average to the 
characteristics of students after the new classrooms are added, with the only difference 
being the number of students in the classroom.  Consequently, the difference in student 
achievement before and after the application of the class size rule should provide an 
unbiased estimate of the class size effect.  Using a regression-discontinuity research 
design, Urquiola finds that the mathematics achievement of third grade students in a class 
of 20 students is 0.24 to 0.45 standard deviations (SD) higher than the achievement of 
students in a class of 30 students. Using a similar analytic strategy in Israel, Joshua 
Angrist and Victor Lavy
18 find a comparable class size effect of 0.46 SD for 5
th grade 
mathematics.
19  A remaining potential source of bias in these estimates, however, is that 
teachers hired to accommodate extra classrooms may be less effective.  In this instance, 
the difference in achievement between the pre- and post-rule group of students may be 
biased downward by the lower average quality of teachers in the latter group.  In other 
words, this design cannot control for the effect of unobserved teacher characteristics.  
Another recent approach to identifying class size effects has been to use panel 
datasets containing measures of student achievement at several points in time and 
information on teachers and their classes in several school years.  Such data permit 
estimation of class size effects by comparing the performances of students taught by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
17    Miguel Urquiola, “Identifying Class Size Effects in Developing Countries: Evidence from Rural 
Schools in Bolivia,” World Bank Working Paper 2711 (October 2000). 
18   Joshua D. Angrist and Victor Lavy, “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class Size on 
Scholastic Achievement,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (May 1999): 533-575. 
19   Such policy rules have also been used in research from the US, but contrary to research from 







    
same teacher in different school years.  Studies using this methodology find smaller class 
size effects than those reported in studies using the regression discontinuity 
methodology.
20  One possible explanation concerns differences in setting.  Panel studies 
of class size effects utilize datasets from the U.S, while studies using the regression 
discontinuity design utilized data from Bolivia and Israel.   
Researchers have also used panel data on teachers and students to examine the 
impact of teaching experience on teaching performance.  One striking finding from these 
studies is that the effectiveness of teachers increases markedly with experience during 
their first years on the job.
21 
As for peer group effects among elementary or secondary school students, to our 
knowledge only two studies make use of data from a random assignment experiment.  
Bryan Graham, using data from the Tennessee STAR experiment, reports that the 
predicted math achievement of a primary school student placed in a class in which the 
average academic ability of classmates was one standard deviation above the average 
value for classrooms in the sample is 0.15 standard deviations higher than the predicted 
math achievement of the same student placed in a class with peers of average academic 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The Effects of Class Size on Student Achievement: New evidence from Population Variation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (November 2000): 1239-1285.   
20   By including dummy variables for every student and every teacher in the sample, studies using such 
datasets are able to eliminate all unobserved time-invariant student characteristics and teacher 
characteristics as sources of bias.  Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Stephen G. Rivkin ( “Teachers, 
Schools, and Academic Achievement,”  NBER Working Paper 6691 (August 1998)) find that a 10-
student difference in class size is associated with only a 0.04 to 0.06 SD difference in student 
achievement.  Using panel data from New Jersey, Jonah E. Rockoff ("The Impact of Individual 
Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data," American Economic Review 94 (May 
2004): 247-252) finds that the effect of class size on mathematics achievement is not statistically 
significant.  








    
ability.
22  In a study using this same dataset but a different methodology, Boozer and 
Cacciola report similar findings.
23 
To date, the best estimates of peer effects in the developing world have been 
obtained from regression models that use school fixed effects to account for unobserved 
differences among schools.  In this approach the effect of peers is estimated by 
comparing achievement differences among students in different classrooms within the 
same school. Applying this strategy to data from Chile, Patrick McEwan
24 finds that 
students in an eighth grade classroom in which the average level of mother’s education of 
classmates is one standard deviation above the average for classrooms in the sample 
score 0.287 SD higher on a test of mathematics achievement than do students in a class in 
which the average level of peers’ mother’s education is at the sample average. This 
estimate may still be biased by unobserved teacher characteristics, however, unless 
students are randomly allocated to classrooms within schools, which does not seem be 
true for the Chilean dataset.
25 
In summary, class size effects have been relatively well estimated in developing 
countries.  However, reliable estimates of peer effects and teacher quality effects on 
                                                 
22   Bryan Graham, Using Conditional Excess Variance Contrasts to Identify Social Interactions: Theory 
and an Application on the Relationship Between Peer Groups and Academic Achievement (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Department of Economics, unpublished manuscript, September 2004). 
23  Michael A. Boozer and Stephen E. Cacciola, “Inside the  'BlackBox' of Project Star: Estimation of Peer 
Effects Using Experimental Data,”  Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 832  (June 2001). 
24   Patrick J. McEwan, “Peer Effects on Student Achievement: Evidence from Chile,” Economics of 
Education Review 22 (April 2003): 131-141. 
25     McEwan, “Peer Effects on Student Achievement”, also estimates the effects of peer composition by 
comparing the test scores of siblings and twins who are assigned to different classrooms, i.e. by using 
siblings/twins fixed effects.  He finds that a one standard deviation difference in the mean mother’s 
education of one’s classroom peers is associated with a difference in mathematics achievement of 
0.371 and 0.536 SD, for the sample of siblings and twins respectively.  These estimates will be biased, 







    
student achievement in developing countries are still unavailable. Given the slow 
progress in understanding roles that different resources play in determining why some 
schools are more effective than others, it is not surprising that progress has also been 
slow in understanding the relative effectiveness of public schools and private schools, 
and the differences between them.
26 In most studies, the private school effect is defined 
as the difference in achievement between public and private schools, net of the pre-
existing characteristics of their students.  This effect is estimated by regressing 
achievement on a private school indicator and an array of student background variables.  
Research from Colombia using this methodology finds a private school advantage in the 
range 0.20 to 0.29 SD for secondary school achievement.
27  However, these models fail 
to control for important student and school characteristics such as parents’ expectations 
and school admissions policies, which may result in selection bias in OLS estimates.  
Attempts have been made to correct this bias using standard Heckman selectivity bias 
corrections, but their application fails to meet critical assumptions.
28      
More reliable estimates of the relative effectiveness of private schools come from 
randomized voucher experiments in which a “treatment” group of students is given 
vouchers to attend a private school, and their post-treatment achievement is compared to 
                                                 
26     For reviews of the evidence, see Patrick J. McEwan, “The potential impact of large-scale voucher 
programs,” Review of Educational Research 70 (Summer 2000): 103-149; and Richard J. Murnane, 
“The Role of Markets in American K-12 Education,” in The Limits of Market Organization, 
ed.,Richard R. Nelson (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).  For evidence pertaining to Latin 
America, see Marie-Andrée Somers, Patrick J. McEwan, and J. Douglas Willms, “How Effective Are 
Private Schools in Latin America?” Comparative Education Review 48 (February 2004).   
27   George Psacharopoulos, “Public vs. Private Schools in Developing Countries: Evidence from 
Colombia and Tanzania,” International Journal of Educational Development 7 (January 1987): 59-67; 
Donald Cox and Emmanuel Jimenez, “The Relative Effectiveness of Private and Public Schools: 








    
that of students who were included in the lottery but did not receive a voucher.  Most 
relevant to this paper is a random assignment experiment conducted for secondary school 
students in Colombia that was evaluated by Joshua Angrist et al.
29  These authors report a 
private school advantage of 0.29 SD.   
Although estimates from randomized experiments are clearly informative, they do 
suffer from the limitation of treating schools as black boxes.  As a result they do not shed 
light on the reasons why private schools are more effective than public schools. This may 
matter, especially if peer group composition is an important determinant of student 
achievement.  A combination of self-selection by parents and the operation of private 
school admission policies may create academically stronger peer groups that enhance the 
effectiveness of private schools.  However, if this is an important part of the explanation 
for the relative effectiveness of private schools, public policies designed to increase 
student enrollments in private schools may result in a reduction in their effectiveness.  
Somers, McEwan and Willms
30 present evidence indicating that the private school effect 
for 3
rd and 4
th grade language and mathematics achievement is no longer statistically 
significant after controlling for peer group socioeconomic status (SES). In Colombia, 
                                                                                                                                                 
28   See Somers, McEwan, and Willms for further discussion. 
29   Joshua Angrist, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Elizabeth King, and Michael Kremer, “Vouchers for 
Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment,” American 
Economic Review 92 (December 2002): 1535-1558.   For experiments in the US, see W.G. Howell, 
P.J. Wolf, D.E. Campbell, and P.E. Peterson, “School Vouchers and Academic performance: Results 
from Three Randomized Field Trials,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21 (Spring 2002): 
91-217; Cecilia, E. Rouse,  “Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (May 1998): 553-602; and 
Eric Bettinger, The Effects of Educational Vouchers on Academic and Non-academic Outcomes: Using 
Experimental Economic Methods to Study a Randomized Natural Experiment (Unpublished 
manuscript, 2003). 







    
more notably, the estimated private school effect is 0.32 SD, but is reduced to 0.02 SD 
when controls for peer SES are included in the model.  Unfortunately, estimated effects 
from the Somers, MacEwan, and Willms study and other studies are likely to be biased 
by the omission of important student and school characteristics – hence the need for new 
research. 
One other limitation of the literature on private school effects is that it does not 
explore the extent to which there is variation in quality among schools within each sector.  
This is critical because the greater the variation in quality among schools in a sector 
relative to the difference in average quality between sectors, the less important is the 
decision about which sector in which to enroll a child, and the more important is the 
decision about which school within a sector in which to enroll a child. 
The effects of class size, peer group composition, and teacher characteristics on 
student achievement, and the roles of these resources in explaining differences in the 
relative effectiveness of public and private schools are all relevant to understanding the 
impacts of Bogotá’s recent policies.  Our approach to investigating these effects is based 
on a special property of our dataset that allows us to address some of the limitations of 
prior work.   
 
IV. Research Design 
Dataset 
To address our research questions, we designed a two-wave study of 5
th grade 







    
population of schools serving fifth grade students in the city, we stratified schools by 
sector (public & private) and by school socio-economic status (SES).
31  We then selected 
schools from these strata randomly. Figure A1 in the appendix contains a flowchart that 
describes how we arrived at the final analytic sample. In 1999, out of the 102 schools 
selected for the study, 14 refused to participate. One year later, we contacted the 88 
remaining schools for follow-up. On this occasion, 10 schools refused to participate, one 
school did not offer 5
th grade, and in four schools the 5
th grade mathematics teacher did 
not answer the questionnaire.  
Of the 3,095 5
th grade students tested in 2000, 714 were either “new” to the 
school or had been absent from school the previous year on the day the fourth grade tests 
were administered.  For these students, we imputed a pretest score using a hot-decking 
procedure.
32,33 The final sample includes 3,095 students from 73 schools, grouped in 97 
5
th grade classrooms and taught by 77 mathematics teachers. Of these students, 1,660 (54 
percent) were enrolled in private schools and 1,435 students (46 percent) in public 
                                                 
31   For administrative purposes, Bogotá is stratified into 6 distinct socio-economic strata with 6 being the 
highest (see footnote 10). Schools in Bogotá are highly segregated by socio-economic level. 
32   The personal and family characteristics used in this procedure included student’s age, gender, number 
of days absent from school, mother’s education, mother head of household, family’s ownership of an 
encyclopedia, computer, car, refrigerator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, phone, and having access 
to electricity in the home. All of the latter have been used as indicators of the student’s socio-
economic level.   We also fitted our final models on the smaller sample of students for whom we had 
complete data.  The results were not substantively different from those reported in the paper. 
33   In order to evaluate the generalizability of our study’s findings to the population from which our 
sample was drawn, we assessed whether the schools and students that did not respond in the second 
wave of data collection differed in any systematic manner from those that did.  On average, non-
matched students are more likely to be male, to have obtained lower scores on the tests, to come from 
single mother households and to have been absent from school more often. Although proportionally 
more public schools dropped out of the study than did private schools, we found no statistically 
significant differences in school average pre-test scores or school SES between public schools that 
participated both years and those that dropped out of the study after the first year. However, among 
private schools, those schools that participated in both years had, on average, higher pre-test scores and 







    
schools.  Our sample includes 37 for-profit schools, nine religious schools, and one 
cooperative school. 
 A particular characteristic of this dataset, which drives an important part of our 
analysis, is that of the 77 teachers in the sample, 13 taught fifth grade mathematics to 
multiple groups of children.  As we discuss below, this characteristic of the data allows 
us to estimate the impacts of class size and peer group quality on student achievement, 
controlling for unobserved teacher characteristics.   
 
Measures 
Our data analyses involve three types of variables (outcome variables, question 
predictors and control predictors) measured at four different levels (the student, the 
classroom, the teacher, and the school).  Table A1 in the appendix lists the variables and 
provides brief descriptions. 
 
Student-Level Outcome and Control Predictors 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables included in 
our data-analysis for the full sample of students and separately for students in public 
schools and private schools. We discuss differences between the sectors later in this 
section. 
Outcome Variable 
Our outcome variable is each student’s score (MSCORE) on an IRT-scaled 







    
Organization (UNESCO) and the Oficina Regional de Educación de la UNESCO para 
América Latina y el Caribe (OREALC),
34 and administered to students in the final weeks 
of their 5
th grade school year.
35 The average mathematics score across all students in the 
sample was almost 300 points, with a standard deviation of about 40.   
 
Control Predictors 
  We included as control predictors the average of each student’s scores on 
achievement tests in mathematics and language taken at the end of the fourth grade 
(PRETEST) and its square.
36  In doing this, we assume that the pretest scores capture 
students’ total educational experience up to that point in time, as well as the effects of 
other earlier student background factors that may be influencing their achievement.  Note 
that the pre-test is scaled differently than the post-test, and as a result we were unable to 
                                                 
34   This test was developed in 1997 for an international comparative study of 3
rd and 4
th graders organized 
by UNESCO’s Laboratorio Latinoamericano de la Calidad de la Educación (LLECE). Thirteen Latin 
American countries, including Colombia, participated in this study. Curriculum and testing experts 
from all participating countries, with the help of the Educational Testing Service (ETS), developed and 
pilot tested the instruments to make them reflect the curriculum of the first four years of primary 
education in the participating countries.  
35   This test has two parallel forms (Form A and Form B), each containing 32 questions. We used both 
forms of this test in the study, randomly distributing each form to approximately half the students in 
each classroom. We included in all models a dichotomous predictor to distinguish the form of the fifth 
grade test taken by each student.  The reported Cronbach’s alpha reliability for Form A of the test is 
.86 and for Form B is .88, as reported in United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Primer Estudio Internacional Comparativo sobre Lenguaje, Matemática y 
Factores Asociados en Tercero y Cuarto Grado: Informe Preparado por el Laboratorio de Evaluación 
de la Calidad de la Educación (Santiago, Chile: UNESCO/OREALC, 1998), p.67.  
36   The 4
th grade tests used in this study were developed by Universidad Nacional for Bogotá’s 
Department of Education 1998 student assessment program where they were used to test 3
rd graders.  
We verified that the substantive results were not different when the models were fit with both the 4
th 
grade reading score and math score included separately as control variables.  Since the fourth grade 
tests were different from the fifth grade tests and it was not possible to create a meaningful common 
metric, it would have been inappropriate to define the outcome variable as the difference between the 







    
use a change score as our outcome variable.
37  
             We included two student demographic characteristics as control predictors: (a) 
AGE, the student’s chronological age, measured in years, and (b) FEMALE, student 
gender, measured as a dichotomous variable (coded 1 for female, and 0 for male).   
Notice, in Table 1, that of the 3,095 students in the sample, 57 percent are girls. This is 
due to the inclusion of 19 all-female classes (and two all-male classes) in the sample of 
97 classes. Also, boys were more likely to change schools and to be absent from school, 
preventing us from matching them on the two years of this study. Students in the sample 
are on average 10.8 years old, and their ages range from eight to seventeen. 
  We used two sets of predictors as indicators of student SES: (a) MHH, a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the mother was head of the household (coded 0=no, 
1=yes), and (b) indicators of the mother’s educational attainment (MOTHED).
38,39 
Approximately one quarter of the students in the sample lived in mother-headed 
households. On average (median and mode) mothers had completed some high school.   
                                                 
37   The pre-tests had 3 parallel forms, each containing 17 questions on mathematics and 17 on language. 
We administered all three forms of the pretest, randomly distributing the forms to approximately one 
third of the students in each classroom. Items were scored separately by subject, on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 306. Students achieved an average of 200.2 points (st. dev. 50) with scores ranging from 12 
to 306 points (6 students in the sample obtained perfect scores).  There are no published reliability or 
validity estimates for the pretests. 
38   In our sample, 356 observations (9.9 percent of the student sample) were missing information on 
mother’s education.   We imputed these missing values by substituting the median value for the 
student’s classmates (we imputed the median rather than the mean because we did not want the 
imputed values to be sensitive to outliers).  Likewise, 178 observations (4.9 percent of the student 
sample) were missing data on whether their mother was head of the household (MHH).  Given that we 
constructed this variable based on students’ responses to whether their father lived with them or not, in 
the cases where they failed to answer we assumed that their father did not. 
39   We chose to use mother’s education rather than father’s education for two reasons.  First, there are a 
number of studies that suggest that mother’s education is more important than father’s education in 
determining IQ, e.g. Arleen Leibowitz, “Home Investments in Children,” Journal of Political Economy 
82 (March 1974): S111-S131.  Second, there was a high percentage of missing data on father’s 
















  We also included as control predictors measures of the student’s school 
attendance, the availability of books in the home, and the support provided at home for 
the completion of homework, which previous studies in Bogotá had found to be related to 
student achievement.
40 We measured these variables, as follows: 
•  DAYABS, the numbers of days that the student was absent from school over the 
previous two weeks.
41  
•  HELPHW, the frequency with which a student receives help with his or her 
homework at home, measured on a Likert-type scale (where 1=never receives help, 
2=sometimes receives help, 3=always receives help).  In the data analyses, we 
converted this ordinal variable into a system of dichotomous (dummy) predictors, 
with HWHELP3 (always receives help) being omitted from the fitted models as a 
reference category.
42   
•  BOOKS, measuring the availability of books in the student’s home, a composite 
variable standardized to a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
43  
In spite of the low levels of mother’s education among students in the sample, 97 percent 
of students reported having books in their homes and 93 percent reported receiving help 
sometimes or always with their homework at home. Students in the sample were absent 
from school an average of 0.65 days in the two weeks preceding completion of the 
questionnaire. 
                                                 
40   Sarmiento et al., “Evaluación de la Calidad”.  
41  In the 77 cases (2.8 percent of the student sample) in which information was missing on this variable, 
we substituted the sample mean for the missing value.  
42   In the 19 cases (0.7 percent of the student sample) in which information was missing for this variable, 
we substituted the value 2, which was the modal response.    
Question Predictors  
To answer our research questions on the influence of classrooms, teachers and 
peers on student achievement, we included two classroom-level question predictors and 
two teacher-level predictors in the data-analyses.  
 
Classroom Characteristics 
The predictor that we used to represent peer-group composition is the “leave-out” 
mean
44 of the student’s classmates’ mothers’ educational level (CLMOTHED).  This is 
defined as the classroom mean of mother’s education, leaving out each student’s own 
value from the calculation. As can be seen in Table 1, students in the sample are likely to 
have a peer-group whose average level of mother’s education is an incomplete secondary 
school education, but there is considerable variation across classrooms.   
We measure class size as the number of students enrolled in each classroom as 
reported by the teacher. On average, classrooms in the sample have 37 students (std. dev. 
8.5) although the range extends from 10 to 53 students.
45 Based on exploratory analyses 
that revealed a non-linear relationship between class size and student achievement, we 
defined our class size predictor (CLASSIZE) as the natural logarithm of the sample 
maximum class size (53) minus the student’s own class size, or ln[53 - class size + 
                                                                                                                                                 
43   For the 15 cases (0.5 percent of the student sample) in which information was missing on this variable, 
we assumed that there were no books in the home. 
44   See Michael A. Boozer and Stephen E. Cacciola, “Inside the  'BlackBox' of Project Star: Estimation of 
Peer Effects Using Experimental Data,”  Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 832  (June 2001). 







    
0.167].
46  Note that we followed Mosteller’s and Tukey’s
47 advice and “started” the 
transformation by adding a small amount (0.167) to the difference in order to avoid 
infinities when the student’s class size equaled the maximum. 
 
Teacher Characteristics 
  We included as predictors two sets of teacher characteristics that are rewarded by 
the existing salary structure.  The first measures educational preparation to teach.  The 
original ordinal variable recorded the teacher’s highest educational degree obtained 
(coded: 1= Pedagogical high school; 2= Education technology (2- or 3-year post 
secondary certificate); 3= A four-year university program in education; 4=Post graduate 
courses, including Masters in education (2 year + thesis), or specialization (1 or 2 years 
graduate level program); 5= Graduate from a five-year university-level program in a field 
other than education).  In our analyses, we converted this ordinal variable into a system 
of dichotomous (dummy) predictors, with completion of a four-year university program 
in education (the modal value in our analytic sample) omitted from the fitted models as a 
reference category.  
We measured teacher experience (TEAEXP) by the number of years that the 5
th 
                                                 
46   We chose a log function over a quadratic function of class size for several reasons.  First, a quadratic 
functional form results in predicted values that first increase and then decrease very sharply with class 
size.  Based on previous research on class size, we deemed this pattern to be implausible.  We 
therefore chose a log functional form because it constrains achievement to be a monotonic function of 
class size.  Second, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the predicted values of student 
achievement from models with the alternative functional forms for class size were not different, when 
evaluated at either the 10
th or 90
th percentile of the class size distribution.  Third, the model’s fit was 
slightly better with the log specification than with the quadratic specification.      
47   Frederick Mosteller and John W. Tukey, Data Analysis and Regression (Boston, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1977), ch.4.  To verify the appropriateness of this recommendation, we estimated a non-linear 







    
grade mathematics teacher had been in the teaching profession.  Given that previous 
research suggests that the relationship between student achievement and teachers’ years 
of experience is non-linear,
48 we included the natural logarithmic transformation of this 
variable (L_TEAEXP) as a predictor in the regression analyses.
49 On average, teachers in 
the sample have 16 years of teaching experience (std. dev. 9.8), while 11 percent have 3 
years or less of experience.  
 
School Sector 
In order to examine the effect of school sector on student achievement, we included a 
dichotomous predictor (PRIVATE), coded 1 = Private, 0 = Public). Fifty four percent of 
the students in the sample attended private schools.  A total of 59 private school 
classrooms located in 47 private schools are included in the sample. 
Data-Analytic Strategy  
The goal of our analysis is to investigate to what extent differences in class size, 
peers, and teacher quality account for differences between the effectiveness of public and 
private elementary schools in Bogotà.  Before proceeding to a comparison of 
achievement across sectors, however, we address two baseline questions.  The first is 
whether student achievement varies across classrooms, net of student characteristics and 
                                                                                                                                                 
value of k that maximized the model fit.  This procedure did indeed return a value very close to the 
recommended value. 
48   Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin; Richard J. Murnane and Barbara R. Phillips, “Learning by Doing, 
Vintage, and Selection: Three Pieces of the Puzzle of Relating Teaching Experience and Teaching 
Performance,” Economics of Education Review 1 (Autumn 1981): 453-465; Rockoff. 
49    As in the case of class size, we chose the log functional form over the quadratic functional form 
because the pattern of predicted values resulting from the latter seemed unlikely, given previous 
research (such as that by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain).  The difference in predicted values between the 
log and quadratic functional forms is not statistically significant at either the 10
th or 90
th percentile of 







    
prior achievement.  The second is whether achievement, net of background 
characteristics, varies among students in different classrooms taught by the same teacher.  
These questions are important because the focus of our analysis is on predictors that vary 
at the classroom or teacher level (e.g. class size, peer group, teacher characteristics).  If 
student achievement, net of background characteristics, did not vary among classrooms, 
our research could not provide any results.  Fortunately, as explained below, student 
achievement is higher in some classrooms than in others, and this is even true among 
classrooms taught by the same teacher.   Our second step is to investigate whether class 
size and peer characteristics explain differences in achievement among classrooms, 
irrespective of sector.  Finally, we estimate the extent to which class size, peer and 
teacher quality explain differences in achievement between the public and private sector.   
In these analyses, to ensure that standard errors are estimated correctly, we fit all 
regression models using either fixed effects or random effects to account for the 
clustering of students within classrooms.  The following section provides greater detail 
on each of the statistical models fitted in our analysis. 
 
Research Question 1 
On average, do children enrolled in some 5
th grade classrooms (or assigned to 
some 5
th grade teachers) have higher end-of-year mathematics achievement than children 
in other classrooms (or children assigned to other teachers), after controlling for student 
SES and end of 4
th grade achievement?  
Do children enrolled in some 5
















year mathematical achievement, on average, than children enrolled in other 5
th grade 
classrooms taught by the same teacher? 
We address these “baseline” research questions using three complementary 
strategies.  First, we use fixed-effects regression analysis to model the relationship 
between a student’s 5
th grade mathematics achievement score and a set of dummy 
predictors representing classroom membership (Model 1a) or teacher membership 
(Model 1b), controlling for a vector of student background characteristics. In these 
models, we allow all students in each classroom or assigned to each teacher to share a 
unique intercept parameter. Inspection of estimates of these intercepts allows us to assess 
whether student mathematics achievement differs by classrooms or by teachers, net of 
selected student background characteristics. Note that the structure of our data does not 
allow us to estimate both teacher and class effects at the same time.  However, any 
differences in “fit” between the teacher and classroom models suggest the existence of 
classroom effects on student achievement that are unique from those of the teacher, an 
issue that is a focus of attention in this analysis. The hypothesized fixed-effects models 
are as follows: 
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th grade mathematics achievement of student i in classroom j or with 
teacher k.  
Dj/k =  vector of classroom or teacher dummy predictors (one per classroom or 
teacher). 
Sij/k =  vector of grand-mean-centered individual-level student characteristics 
for student i in classroom j or with teacher k. 
β0j/k =  intercept (“fixed effect”) for classroom j or teacher k (the average 
mathematics achievement of students in classroom j or with teacher k, 
adjusted for the included student control characteristics). 
 β1 =  parameter vector representing the effects of the student characteristics. 
εij/k =  residual for student i in classroom j or with teacher k. 
  
We test the null hypothesis that all classroom fixed effects (intercept parameters 
β0j) or teacher fixed effects (intercept parameters β0k) are simultaneously equal.  If we 
reject these null hypotheses, we can conclude, in Model 1a, that the fifth grade classroom 
(or, in the case of Model 1b, the fifth grade math teacher) to which the student was 
assigned influenced his or her end of 5
th grade mathematics achievement score, net of 
included student control characteristics.  
It is important to note, however, that the obtained fixed effects coefficients are 
estimates, and are therefore fallible (contain error).  Consequently, the sample variance of 
the estimated fixed effects is inflated (biased upward), relative to the estimated variance 
of the true fixed effects.  To estimate the variance of the true fixed effects, 
2









therefore adopt a second strategy, using random effects regression analysis:  
 
(1a*)  ) ( 1 0 ij j ij ij u S Y ε β β + + + =   
(1b*)  ) ( 1 0 ik k ik ik u S Y ε β β + + + =   
 
where µj/k is the deviation of the average mathematics achievement of students in 
classroom j or with teacher k from the grand mean of achievement (the µj/k are also called 
the random-effects). The random effects approach represented in Models 1a* and 1b* 
embeds deviations of the mean achievement for teachers/classrooms into the error 
structure, rather than retaining them as fixed effects in the structural part of the model as 
Models 1a and 1b .   
The advantage of using a random-effects regression approach is that it estimates 
the variance of the true classroom/teacher effects directly, rather than obtaining an error-
inflated sample variance of estimated fixed effects.  We can therefore use the random-
effects approach to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the true fixed effects is 
zero (H0: 0
2 = µ σ ), using a Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test.   
The disadvantage of random effects regression, however, is that it does not 
eliminate bias in model coefficients (the β1’s) caused by the unobserved and non-random 
sorting of students to teachers, as does the fixed effects regression approach.  Therefore, 
in our analyses, we use random effects regression to test whether there is statistically 
significant variation in teacher and classroom effects, but use the parameter estimates 









pertaining to the impact of student, classroom and teacher characteristics on achievement.   
Finally, in a third exercise, we return to fixed effects analysis.  In order to 
examine whether there are classroom-specific characteristics that exert an influence 
above and beyond the impact of the teacher, we test the null hypothesis that all classroom 
coefficients β0j that pertain to classrooms taught by the same teacher are simultaneously 
equal. If we can reject these null hypotheses, we can conclude that even among 
classrooms taught by the same teacher, average student achievement differs across 
classrooms, net of included student control characteristics.  
While the above strategy can detect the presence of classroom or teacher effects, 
it does not reveal which specific classroom and teacher characteristics are responsible for 
the effects. Our next research questions examine this issue.  
 
Research question 2 
Do the student-body composition and number of students in the class in which a 
student spent the 5
th grade influence his or her 5
th grade mathematics achievement score?  
To answer this question, we fit a set of regression models in which we add class 
size and peer group composition as predictors to the baseline teacher fixed-effects model 
(Model 1b).  With this strategy, we examine whether differences in class size and peer 
groups among classes taught by the same teacher explain differences in student 
achievement.  The regression model has the following form:  
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Where additional variables and parameters are defined as follows:  
 
Yijk = 5
th grade mathematics achievement of student i in classroom j with teacher 
 k. 
             Dk =  vector of teacher dummy predictors (one per teacher). 
Sijk =  vector of grand-mean-centered individual-level student characteristics for 
student i in classroom j with teacher k. 
Cjk = vector of grand-mean-centered classroom and peer-group characteristics of 
classroom j with teacher k. 
β1 =  parameter vector representing the effects of the student characteristics. 
β2 = parameter vector representing the effects of the classroom and peer-group 
characteristics. 
εijk = residual for student i in classroom j with teacher k. 
 
 
Our strategy of including a set of dummy predictors to represent all observed and 
unobserved differences in the outcome among teachers (the fixed effects of teachers) 
resolves a problem that has plagued previous studies, namely, the non-random 
assignment of students to teachers.  Once teacher fixed effects are included in the model, 
we are still able to estimate the impact of the classroom-level class-size and peer-group 
predictors on student achievement because our dataset contains some teachers who taught 
multiple classes, thereby providing classroom-level outcome variation that is not 
eliminated by the inclusion of the teacher fixed effects.  However, our strategy will 
produce unbiased estimates of class size and peer group effects (β2) only if students are    
randomly assigned to different classes taught by the same teacher.  To learn about 
assignment processes, we interviewed a teacher or administrator in each of the 13 schools 
in which individual teachers taught mathematics to more than one fifth grade class.  Our 
respondents reported that in all but two cases, students were assigned to classes to obtain 
a mix of student backgrounds and abilities in each class and to roughly equalize class 
sizes. In two cases students with especially low or high skills were assigned to a 
particular class.  We eliminated these two classrooms from the analytic sample.  
To further verify that students taught by the same teacher were not assigned to 
classes on the basis of ability or socioeconomic status, we utilized a strategy proposed by 
McEwan,
50  in which “virtual” classrooms are created by randomly reassigning students 
into “new” classrooms.  Comparing the distribution of class size and peer group 
composition in the “virtual classrooms” with those in the actual classrooms, we found 
almost no differences in the two distributions.
51   Of course, this means that there is only 
modest variation in class size and peer composition among classrooms taught by the 
same teacher, and as a result our tests of class size and peer group effects have little 
statistical power.   
In summary, we believe that our method of making use of a unique property of 
our Bogotá dataset provides new insights into the roles that class size and peer group 
composition play in explaining the relative effectiveness of public and private schools.  
However, our empirical results are by no means definitive because they are based on 
                                                 
50  Patrick J. McEwan, “Peer Effects on Student Achievement: Evidence from Chile,” Economics  of        
Education Review 22 (April 2003): 131-141. 
51    This simulation exercise allowed us to compare not only the mean characteristics of the classrooms 
















estimates from student achievement in the modest number of classrooms (33) taught by 
the 13 teachers who taught more than one fifth grade class.  
 
Research Questions 3a, 3b, and 3c 
Do students enrolled in private schools have higher mathematics achievement 
than students enrolled in public schools, after controlling for (a) student background 
characteristics; (b) student background characteristic and peer group composition; and 
(c) student background characteristics, peer group composition, and class size? 
 
To address question 3a we fit the random effects regression model below (Model 
3).  This model is similar to our Model 1a, except that the classroom-specific intercepts 
(the classroom fixed effects) have been converted into the corresponding random effects, 
uj, in order that school-sector (PRIVATE) can be included as a predictor:  
 
(3)  ijk j jk ijk ijk u PRIVATE S Y ε β β β + + + + = 3 1 0  
 
where: 
β0 =  intercept parameter representing the average student 5
th grade mathematics 
achievement (across all classrooms and teachers), controlling for all 
predictors in the model. 
β3 =  effect of the school sector of classroom j with teacher k on student 5
th grade 
mathematics achievement, controlling for all other predictors in the model. 
uj =  random effect of classroom j on student 5
th grade mathematics achievement.    
  
To address question 3b, we add the predictor representing peer group composition 
to the model described above (to provide Model 3b); to address question 3c, we further 
add the class size predictor (to provide Model 3c).   
Unlike the corresponding estimates obtained from our teacher fixed effects model 
(Model 2), it is possible that the estimated effect of school sector obtained in our 
classroom random effects model (Model 3) may be biased by the omission of unobserved 
student and classroom characteristics.  However, we can reduce the magnitude of the bias 
in the school sector effect in Models 3b and 3c by constraining the effects of the class 
size and peer group predictors to the estimates  that we obtained in our teacher fixed 
effects specification (Model 2), and by controlling for students’ pre-test scores.  The logic 
to constraining these coefficients in this way is that, by virtue of its fixed effects 
specification, Model 2 takes into account all unobserved teacher quality differences with 




Research Question 4: 
Does a student’s math achievement at the end of 5
th grade depend on his or her 
5
th grade math teacher’s qualifications and years of teaching experience? 
 
To address this research question, we supplement the hypothesized random 
effects model in Model 3, above, as follows:  
                                                 
52   We also tested whether including interactions between PRIVATE and the other predictors in the model 

















(4)   ijk j jk jk jk ijk ijk u TEACHER PRIVATE C S Y ε β β β β β + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
 
Where: 
β4  =  effect of a vector of teacher qualifications and teaching experience, 
controlling for vectors of student and classroom characteristics. 
 
Again, and for the same reasons, we constrain the coefficients on the class size and peer 
group quality predictors to their values estimated from fitting Model 2.   
 
V.  Findings 
Do Classrooms and Teachers Matter to Student Mathematics Achievement?  
The 5
th grade classroom and teacher to which a student was assigned makes a 
difference to his or her end of 5
th grade mathematics achievement score.  Based on tests 
of the equality of the fixed-effects across the 97 classrooms in Model 1a and across the 
77 teachers in Model 1b, we can reject the null hypotheses that there are no differences 
among classrooms (F=4.30; p<.001) and no differences among teachers (F=4.77; 
p<.001).
53   
It is important to remember that the sample variance of the estimated teacher and 
classroom fixed-effects is inflated (biased upward) by the fallibility of the estimates. As 
explained earlier, one way of dealing with the fallibility of the estimated 
classroom/teacher fixed effects is to fit a random-effects model, and to estimate the 
                                                                                                                                                 
jointly equal to 0 (χ
2=11.91, p=0.4528, df=12, based on Model 3b).  We therefore include only the 









variance of the true teacher or classroom effects directly (Models 1a* and 1b*).  After 
controlling for the effects of the usual student background characteristics, we find that the 
estimated variance of true classroom effects is 69.3, and statistically significant 
(p<0.001).
54  
Note that the estimated variance of the estimated classroom fixed-effects is 159.8, 
which is more than twice the size of the estimated true variance obtained directly from 
the random-effects model.   This implies a high degree of error in the fixed-effects 
estimates, and indicates that the estimated reliability of our measurement of the 
classroom fixed-effects is less than 0.5 (69.4/159.8 = 0.434).  The estimated inter-quartile 
range of the true classroom fixed-effects (after disattenuating for the fallibility of the 
estimates) is 9.8 points.  This is about half of the difference between the median scores of 
3
rd graders and 4
th graders when the same test was administered to large samples of 
students in these grades in Colombia in 1999.
55   Applying random-effects regression 
analysis to teachers rather than classrooms reveals that the estimated variance of true 
teacher effects is 51.5 (p<0.001),
56  which is less than half the estimated variance of the 
estimated teacher effects from the fixed effects analysis (139.5).  In this case, the 
estimated inter-quartile spread in true fixed-effects is 9.2 points.    
These findings suggest two complementary lessons.  First, consistent with 
parents’ beliefs, some teachers are much more effective than others in helping students 
learn mathematics.  Second, consistent with the beliefs of many teachers, average student 
                                                                                                                                                 
53     F96,2986=4.30***. 
54     The χ
2 test statistic (1 degree of freedom) is 337.2. 
55   UNESCO, p.258. 
56    The χ
2 test statistic (1 degree of freedom) is 418.2.    
test scores, adjusted for student background characteristics, are quite unreliable measures 
of teacher effectiveness.   
 
Is It Teachers Or Classrooms That Matter?  
To answer this question, we tested for the equality of the classroom fixed effects 
among groups of classrooms taught by the same teacher (after controlling for student 
background characteristics).  We reject the global null hypothesis that there were no 
differences in the average achievement (net of student background characteristics) of 
students in different classes taught be the same teacher. 
57  This is important because it 
means that it is possible, in subsequent analyses, for class size and peer group effects to 
make a difference in explaining why student achievement is higher in some classrooms 
than in others taught by the same teacher.    
Before turning to the roles of specific classroom attributes in predicting student 
math achievement, we summarize briefly the impacts of those student-level 
characteristics that have the strongest impacts on student achievement within-classrooms 
(see Appendix Table A2, first column of estimates in top half). First, as many other 
studies have shown, a student’s achievement score at the end of one grade (4
th) is a strong 
predictor of the student’s achievement at the end of the next grade (5
th).  Second, on 
average, boys outperform girls by an average of 8 points (p<.001).  Third, younger 
students perform slightly better on average than older students (p<.001), a likely result of 
accumulated academic failure among the latter. Fourth, 5
th grade mathematics 







    
additional day in the two weeks before the math test was administered have scores that 
are 1.9 points less, on average (p<.001). 
 
Do peer-group composition and class size matter to student mathematics achievement? 
As other researchers have pointed out,
58 the estimation of peer effects and class 
size effects has often been biased as a result of failing to account for the non-random 
assignment of students to teachers. To minimize this problem, we rely on variation in 
peer groups among classes taught by the same teacher in the same school.   
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 2 contain estimates of parameters from Models 2a, 
2b, and 2c, which include fixed effects for teachers and different combinations of the two 
class-specific predictors, class size and peer group composition.  As indicated in Models 
2b and 2c in columns 3 and 4, the point estimates suggest that students in classrooms in 
which their peers have more educated mothers achieve higher mathematics scores.     
While the relevant coefficients in the teacher fixed effects models are not statistically 
significant, they are similar in value to the statistically significant coefficients in the 
analogous models fitted with random effects in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.
59    
Based on the fitted fixed effects from Model 2b in column 3, a one SD difference 
                                                                                                                                                 
57   F=7.1, p<0.001. 
58   Caroline M. Hoxby, “Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation,”  
NBER Working Paper 7867 (August 2000); McEwan, “Peer Effects on Student Achievement”; Boozer 
and Cacciola. 
59    In essence, the parameter estimates from the fixed effects models are less biased than those from the 
analogous random effects models.  On the other hand, because there are only 13 teachers in our sample 
who teach multiple classes, the standard errors of the estimates from fixed effects models will be larger 
than those from random-effect models, resulting in a loss of power when making statistical inferences.  
Fortunately, the estimated peer effects from the fixed effects and random effects models (in Table 2) 







    
in the average value of mothers’ education is associated with a 0.150 std. dev. difference 
in individual students’ math achievement.  This is a little more than half the size of the 
analogous peer group effect of 0.287 SD estimated by McEwan
60 using data from Chile.  
The difference may stem from differences in the age of the students, or differences in 
model specification -- our model controls for unobserved teacher characteristics.  Our 
estimate of the magnitude of the peer effect is almost identical to that found by Graham 
in his analysis of the Tennessee STAR experiment.
61 
Bryan Graham
62 provides a more powerful method of detecting the contribution 
of peer effects to achievement.  His rationale begins with the observation that, if peer 
effects on student achievement do exist, there will be greater between-classroom 
variation in student achievement than one would expect in the absence of peer effects.  In 
other words, “excess” between-group variation will be present.  Of course, in a setting in 
which each teacher teaches only a single classroom, the presence of excess variance 
could simply reflect the impact of heterogeneity in teacher quality and not peer effects.  
But, in our sample, some teachers teach multiple classes of students and so we can use a 
variant of Graham’s method to separate peer and teacher effects providing we assume 
                                                                                                                                                 
all.  As such, we can use the (more precise) standard errors from the analogous random effects model 
to make statistical inferences.   
60   McEwan, “Peer Effects on Student Achievement”.  Given our identification strategy,  it is possible that 
the “peer effect” actually reflects differences in the effectiveness with which the same teacher teaches 
groups of students with different characteristics. 
61   We also tried estimating peer effects using an alternate measure of peer composition: the percentage of 
students in classroom j with two parents.  In the fixed effects specification (Model 2b), a 1 percent 
difference in the number of children from a two-parent family results in a 35.3 point difference in a 
classroom’s average test score (and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level).  Thus using this 
alternate measure also leads us to conclude that peer effects are statistically significant in our dataset. 
62    Bryan Graham, "Using Conditional Excess Variance Contrasts to Identify Social Interactions: Theory 
and an Application on the Relationship Between Peer Groups and Academic Achievement,” Harvard 







    
that “teaching quality” is constant across classrooms taught by the same teacher.
63   In 
this application, excess between-classroom variation across classrooms taught by the 
same teacher can be attributed to peer group effects.  To implement Graham’s approach, 
we therefore use data from the students of teachers with multiple classrooms to estimate 
the actual between-classroom variance in student achievement, as well that which would 
be expected were there no peer effects.
64  If the ratio of these two variances is greater than 
1, then positive peer effects are present.  We find an excess variance ratio of 2.2, 
suggesting the presence of peer effects.  However, due to the small sample size and  the 
modest variation in peer composition among classrooms taught by the same teacher, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the magnitude of the ratio is different from unity.
65   
Returning to Table 2, the estimates from Models 2a and 2c (in columns 2 and 4) 
indicate that class size is a statistically significant predictor of student achievement.   
(Figure A2 in the appendix presents this fitted relationship.)  Based on this fitted model, 
students in a classroom with 30 students are predicted to score 0.35 standard deviations 
higher (13.5 points) than students in a classroom with 40 students. The magnitude of the 
impact is quite similar to that reported by Urquiola in Bolivia and Angrist and Lavy in 
Israel (who find that mathematics achievement is 0.24-0.45. and 0.46 of a standard 
deviation higher in a class that is 10 students smaller, respectively). 
Notice in Table 2 that while class size is a strong predictor of student achievement 
in the models fitted with teacher fixed effects, this is not the case in the models fitted with 
                                                 
63   Although a reasonable assumption, it is nonetheless restrictive; for example, teachers may be more or 
less effective when teaching material for the first time, or in the morning, etc. 
64   See Graham’s paper for details of the estimation of the actual and expected variances. 







    
classroom random effects.  The explanation is that, in the Bogotá schools included in our 
sample, the most effective teachers were assigned to work with the largest classes. 
Consequently, we argue that estimates of the class size effect from the random effects 
models – that do not fully control for differences in teacher quality – are biased. 
 One implication of this pattern is that estimates of the relative effectiveness of 
individual teachers taken from models that control for class size and peer group effects 
are quite different from estimates taken from models that do not control for these factors.  
For example, one teacher in our sample ranked 43
rd in terms of average student 
achievement when only the student level characteristics were controlled; this teacher 
ranked first when both peer-group composition and class size were included as 
predictors. Figure 1 displays plots that present the sample distribution of the estimated 
coefficients on the teacher fixed-effects from fitted Model 1b, and Models 2b and 2c. 
Notice that variation in estimated teacher quality is much larger when estimated from 
fitted Model 2c, which controls for class size, than when derived from the fitted models 
that do not.  The explanation is that more effective teachers were assigned to the largest 
classes in the data set.  The net result is that differences in class size, when not taken into 
account, reduce the estimated variation in teacher quality.  This finding raises serious 
questions about school accountability initiatives that attribute differences in average 
student achievement across classrooms solely to differences in teacher quality.   
 
Does School Sector Matter to Student Achievement? 







    
are more economically advantaged, on average, than those students who attended public 
schools.  Private school students are less likely to live in mother-headed families than are 
public school students.  Their mothers have more education, on average, than the mothers 
of public school students.  The differences in individual student characteristics between 
public and private schools naturally result in corresponding differences in the 
characteristics of peer-groups by sector. As a result, public school students have less 
advantaged peer groups than do private school students.  Public school students are also 
likely to study in classrooms with larger class sizes than are private school students.   
  One respect in which public school students have a potential advantage over 
students in private schools is in the academic preparation and experience of their 
teachers.  No public school teacher in the sample has less than six years of teaching 
experience in contrast to 28 percent of private school teachers.  While almost 70 percent 
of public school teachers have a Master’s Degree or are working towards one, the 
corresponding figure for private school teachers is 12 percent. As explained earlier, this 
pattern stems primarily from the public school teacher salary scale and its applicability to 
private schools.  The salary schedule provides strong incentives for public school 
teachers to gain educational credentials and to remain in teaching.  The requirement that 
private schools pay teachers according to this same schedule creates incentives for private 
schools to avoid highly experienced teachers with significant educational credentials 
because they are very expensive.  One-third of private school teachers are on the first step 
of the salary scale.  No public school teachers are on the first step and more than 95 







    
We turn now to the question of whether the differences in peer groups, class sizes, 
and teacher characteristics contribute to differences in the achievement of students 
attending schools in the two sectors. The average achievement difference between the 
two sectors can be found in Table 3, as indicated by the estimated coefficient of 
PRIVATE in the different specifications of Model 3.  We also illustrate the variability in 
average student achievement among groups of students taught by different teachers in 
each sector by plotting the estimated teacher fixed effects from Models 1 and 2 by sector 
(see Figure 2).    
Panel A of Figure 2 displays the distribution of average teacher-specific fifth 
grade student math scores in public schools and private schools in the sample.  The mean 
of the distribution for students in private schools is 8 points higher than the mean for 
students in public schools (based on the estimated coefficient of PRIVATE for Model 
3a* in Table 3, which does not include the student-level controls).  This is not a surprise 
given the difference between the average socioeconomic status of private school students 
and public school students.    What is striking is the wide variation in teacher-specific 
average achievement among teachers in both sectors.  This highlights that private schools 
in the sample do not all serve high achieving students.   
Panel B of Figure 2 displays the distribution of predicted average student 
achievement for different teachers, after controlling for student background 
characteristics including pre-score, by sector (i.e. the teacher fixed effects from Model 
1b).   The difference in the adjusted average achievement of students in the two sectors is 







    
results of Model 3a in Table 3.  This estimate is much smaller than the Colombian 
estimate from Somers, McEwan and Willms (0.32 SD), even though both estimates were 
obtained from a similar model, and from datasets of students of comparable age.  It is 
also smaller than that reported by Angrist et al. in their evaluation of the voucher 
experiment in Colombia (0.29 SD). A plausible explanation is that the mix of private 
schools in the country as a whole is different from the mix of private schools in our 
Bogotá sample.  (The statistically significant variation in predicted average student 
achievement among students taught by different private school teachers indicates how 
sensitive the size of the “private school effect” is to the composition of the private school 
sample.) 
Panel C of Figure 2 displays the distribution of predicted average achievement of 
students taught by different teachers taken from fitted Model 2b, which controls for peer 
group as well as for student background, by sector.  Net of student background and the 
peer group effect, the adjusted achievement of students in private school classes is four 
points lower than that of students in the public sector (or 0.10 SD), based on the results of 
Model 3b in Table 3.  This highlights that a high SES peer group is one of the relative 
advantages many private schools offer.  However, again it is striking how great the 
variation in average student achievement is among students enrolled in the classes of 
different private school teachers.   
Finally, Panel D of Figure 2 displays the distribution of predicted average 
achievement of students taught by different teachers taken from fitted Model 2c, which 







    
The adjusted mean achievement for private school students is now 14.5 points lower than 
the analogous mean for public school students, based on the results of Model 3c in Table 
3.  The explanation is that class size and peer groups matter to student achievement and, 
on average, class sizes are smaller and peer groups are more advantaged in the private 
sector.   
Interpreting the estimated teacher fixed effects displayed in Panel D as our best 
estimates of teacher quality, the wide range of quality estimates for private school 
teachers is remarkable, especially relative to the magnitude of the variation in estimated 
effectiveness among public school teachers.  The best private school teachers appear to 
be better than the best public school teachers, while the worst private school teachers 
appear to be considerably less effective than the worst public school teachers.
66  
Unfortunately, we do not know whether the least effective private school teachers are 
more likely to be dismissed for poor performance than the weakest public school 
teachers.   
These findings raise the question of whether there is a statistically significant 
difference in the variation of teacher quality between the public and private sectors.  As 
previously discussed, the estimated variance of the estimated teacher fixed effects is 
inflated by the errors of estimation, such that we must once again use random effects 
regression analysis to better estimate the variance in true teacher effects.  To achieve this, 
we fit the following regression model, in which we permit the variance of the teacher 
                                                 
66   It is important to point out that we do not know for sure that the average differences in achievement 
among students in classrooms taught by different teachers represent teacher effects.  Although we do 
















random effects to differ by sector: 
 
) ( 2 1 0 ijk k k k k jk ijk ijk D I PRIVATE S Y ε ν η β β β + + + + + =  
 
where ηk and vk  are sector-specific teacher random-effects, and Ik and Dk are indicator 
variables such that Ik=1 if a student’s school is public, and Dk =1 if a student’s school is 
private, otherwise they are set to zero.  By comparing the -2*(log likelihood) statistic of 
this sector-heterogeneous teacher random effects model to that of  a model with sector-
homogeneous teacher random effects, we can test whether permitting a sector-specific 
error structure significantly contributes to model fit.  This is equivalent to testing the null 
hypothesis that the population variances of teacher random effects in the public and 
private sectors are identical, 
2 2
v σ ση = .   We find that the sector-specific variances of the 
teacher random effects are 64.8 in the public sector and almost double – 123.2 – in the 
private sector.  Again, because of low statistical power, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the true teacher random effects is the same across 
sectors.
67  
In conclusion, the panels of Figure 2 shed light on differences in the ways that 
public schools and private schools “produce” student achievement.  As indicated in Panel 
B, on average, private schools in our Bogotá sample are as effective as public schools in 
                                                                                                                                                 
unmeasured  classroom-specific differences that account for some of the classroom-specific 
achievement differences. 
67    χ
2=
 2.1, df=1, p=0.147.  
    
producing student achievement.  However, schools in the two sectors use very different 
mixes of resources.  On average, private schools have less skilled teachers than public 
schools, but they compensate by having smaller classes and somewhat more advantaged 
student peers.    
 
Do Teacher Qualifications and Experience matter to Student Achievement? 
  The difference between the two sectors in the average quality of teachers and the 
extraordinary variation in teacher quality among teachers in the private sector prompts 
the question: do teaching experience and educational credentials, the attributes rewarded 
in the national teachers’ contract, also predict teaching performance?   
To answer this question, we fitted the set of regression models presented in Table 
4 that estimate the effects of teacher education and years of experience on student 
mathematics achievement, with classrooms treated as a random effect. An important 
disadvantage of using a random effects specification, however, is that the estimated 
effects of class size and peer composition will be biased, given that these variables may 
be correlated with unobserved teacher quality.  In estimating Models 4a and 4b, we 
therefore constrain the parameters associated with the peer group and class size predictors 
to their values estimated in the fixed effects analysis (Model 2c), which are not biased by 
unobserved teacher quality.  For comparative purposes, we display the results from fitting 
these models with the peer group and class size parameters left unconstrained (Models 4c 
and 4d).  
Figure 3 illustrates the fitted relationship between student achievement and 







    
slope of this relationship is quite steep during a teacher’s first years in the classroom, 
after which the fitted relationship becomes flatter. This supports the findings from other 
recent studies which suggest that the greatest gains from additional experience occur 
during the first years of teaching.
68  Notice, however, that in Models 4c and 4d the 
coefficient on this predictor is close to zero, suggesting that more experienced teachers 
appear to be assigned to larger classes and the most needy groups of students, thus 
exerting a compensatory effect that neutralizes the effects of experience. 
Notice in Models 4a and 4b that teachers who have less than a four-year college 
education are less effective, on average, than those with a four year degree.  Nine percent 
of the teachers in private schools in the sample have less than a four-year degree 
compared to two percent of public school teachers.  Thus, differences in educational 
credentials and years of teaching experience help to explain the difference between the 
average quality of private school teachers and those of public school teachers.   
It is also important to point out that the estimates for Models 4a and 4b indicate 
that teachers with educational credentials beyond a four-year degree (EDLEVEL4) are 
not more effective, on average, than are those with a four-year degree.  This supports the 
view of many Bogotá school officials that a salary schedule that rewards post-graduate 
educational credentials is not an efficient use of scarce resources. 
  A final pattern to notice is that the percentage of the variation in student 
achievement explained by Model 4b (20.6) – a random effects model that includes 
predictors for teacher experience and educational credentials – is much lower than the 
                                                 








    
percentage of variation explained by Model 2c (35.1), a model that includes fixed effects 
for teachers.  The explanation is that, while information on educational credentials and 
years of teaching experience do indeed play a role in predicting teacher quality, they 
explain only a modest part of the variation in effectiveness among teachers in enhancing 
student achievement.   
 
VI.  Lessons 
We conclude by describing four lessons about the consequences of initiatives by 
the Bogotá government to greatly expand access to elementary school education.  First, it 
is likely that expanding access led to a decline in the average quality of education.  One 
mechanism through which this took place is that class sizes in public school classrooms 
increased.  Another is that private schools hired teachers with relatively low skills. The 
likely decline in average quality does not mean that expanding access was a mistake – 
only that, given severe resource constraints, it was not accomplished without cost.   
The second lesson is that the government’s two-pronged strategy for expanding 
access seems quite efficient, given the assumption that it was unable politically to change 
the structure of public school teachers’ compensation schedule or prevent its extension to 
private schools.  Public schools, with very experienced and highly educated teachers, 
were told to serve more students.  They responded by having the most skilled teachers 
teach the largest classes. It was probably less expensive to subsidize private schools that 
served low-income students than it was to educate the children in public schools.  While 
schools in the two sectors produced achievement with quite different input mixes, on 







    
The third lesson concerns the teacher salary schedule.  Our evidence indicates that 
teachers with education beyond a four-year college degree were not more effective in 
producing student achievement than teachers with a four-year degree were.  Thus, unless 
it could be demonstrated that the most highly educated teachers made contributions 
greater than other teachers in respects not measured by test scores, challenging the 
structure of the salary scale may be a way to improve efficiency.   
  Finally, the importance of peer groups in influencing student achievement creates 
a difficult public policy problem. Peer group effects create strong incentives for parents 
with resources to try to place their children in schools with advantaged peers and for 
schools interested in attracting students from such families to specialize in serving such 
families. The resulting sorting by socioeconomic status widens inequality in access to 
good schooling. Evidence from New Zealand and Chile demonstrates that such sorting by 
socioeconomic status does take place in large scale voucher plans in which the value of 
the voucher is the same for all students.
69  
  One way to reduce the likelihood of sorting by socioeconomic status is to use 
differentially valued vouchers that create incentives for schools to attract students whom 
they would otherwise spurn.
70  This idea has a long history.
71  To date, there has been no 
significant trial of a school choice system with differentially valued vouchers.  
  The value of vouchers is only one of many critical details in the design of a 
voucher system.  Others concern whether schools can charge families more than the value 
                                                 
69    On New Zealand, see Fiske and Ladd ; on Chile, see Chang-Tai Hsieh and Miguel Urquiola. 
70   Caroline M. Hoxby, Ideal Vouchers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University unpublished manuscript, 
2001); Dennis Epple and Richard Romano, “Education Vouchers and Cream-Skimming,” NBER 







    
of a child’s voucher, the quality of information available on school performance, the 
process through which spaces are allocated in schools for which demand exceeds supply, 
rules about dismissing difficult students, and the availability of free transportation.   By 
influencing the options available to low income families and the attractiveness of 
participation to potential suppliers of school services, these details are likely to influence 
how an educational voucher system would influence the quality of education provided to 
children from different backgrounds. 
  Perhaps the most important lesson from this paper for the debate over school 
vouchers is that the concept of unregulated markets is of little value in predicting 
outcomes.  The reason is that, in the language of economics, peer group effects are 
externalities, and unregulated, competitive markets do not produce an efficient allocation 
of resources when externalities are present.  Any school choice system will be a system 
with regulations.  It is important to pay attention to how, in the face of peer group effects, 
parents choosing schools and entrepreneurs with different motivations for starting schools 
respond to the detailed regulations that define a choice system.  These responses will 
determine how the system influences the quality of education provided to children from 
different backgrounds. 
                                                                                                                                                 







    
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Outcome and Predictors, by Sector 
 
VARIABLE FULL  SAMPLE 
n students =3,095 
n classrooms=97 












OUTCOME VARIABLE  
  MSCORE  297.6 (39.1)  292.3 (38.1)  302.2 (39.4) 
 
STUDENT-LEVEL CONTROL PREDICTORS 
  PRETEST  200.2 (50.1)  191.2 (49.4)  207.9 (49.4) 
  FEMALE  .57  .59  .56 
  AGE  10.8 (.97)  11.0 (1.1)  10.7 (.83) 
  DAYABS  .65 (1.4)  .73 (1.5)  .58 (1.3) 
  MHH  .25  .27  .22 
  MOTHED1  .06  .09  .04 
  MOTHED2  .26  .32  .20 
  MOTHED3  .37  .40  .35 
  MOTHED4  .31  .19  .41 
  BOOKS  0 (1.00)  -.16 (1.16)  .14 (.81) 
  HWHELP1  .07  .07  .07 
  HWHELP2  .81  .8  .82 
  HWHELP3  .12  .13  .11 
 
CLASS-LEVEL PREDICTORS  
  CLMOTHED  2.9 (.48)  2.7 (.37)  3.1 (.47) 
  CLASS SIZE  36.8 (8.5)  40.2 (3.8)  33.9 (10.1) 
 
TEACHER PREDICTORS  
  EDLEVEL1  .05  .02  .07 
  EDLEVEL2  .01  0  .02 
  EDLEVEL3  .49  .30  .65 
  EDLEVEL4  .38  .68  .12 
  EDLEVEL5  .07  0  .13 







    
 
Table 2 
Fixed and Random Effects Regression Models  Showing the Estimated Effects of Peer-
Group Composition and Class Size on Students’ 5
th grade Mathematics Achievement 
Score 
(n students=3,095; n classrooms =97; n teachers=77) 
 
 
TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS   
 
CLASSROOM RANDOM EFFECTS 
 
  2a  2b  2c    2a (r.e.)  2b (r.e.)  2c (r.e.) 
CLASS-LEVEL PREDICTORS   
   CLMOTHED    12.199  7.932      13.805***  12.698*** 
   CLASSIZE
  26.534*   23.919~    -0.483    -1.011 
 
Goodness of Fit 
      
R
2 “overall”  0.351  0.350  0.351    0.290  0.312  0.312 
~p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Notes: Class-size is represented by a modified log transformation described in Section 3 of the text. Under 
this transformation, smaller values of class size correspond to larger values in the transformed predictor.  
Coefficients associated with the teacher fixed effects and the control predictors have been omitted from the 
table to save space.  The regression coefficients associated with the control predictors can be found in 












    
Figure 1 




































Student Controls (Model 1b) + Peer Composition (Model 2b)











    
 
Table 3 
Taxonomy of Classroom Random effects Regression Models  Estimating the 
Effects of School Sector on Students’ 5
th grade Mathematics Achievement Score 












constrained to its 





Class Size and 
CLMOTHED 
constrained to 




   CLMOTHED      (12.199)  (7.932) 
   CLASSIZE        (23.919) 
 
SCHOOL SECTOR (PRIVATE=1) 
   PRIVATE  8.239*  0.754  -3.789~  -14.502*** 
 
 
Goodness of Fit 
    
R
2  “within”  0.009 0.200 0.201 0.201 
R
2  “between”  0.050 0.650 0.681 0.294 
R
2  “overall” 0.025 0.290 0.316 0.195 
 
~p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 







    
Figure 2 
Distribution of Estimated Teacher Fixed Effects by Sector and Model Specification 
(Panel B is based on fitted Model 1; Panel C is based on fitted Model 2b; and Panel D is 











































































































































    
Table 4 
Taxonomy of Fitted Constrained and Unconstrained Random effects 
Models  Showing the Estimated Effects of Teacher Characteristics on 
Students’ 5
th grade Mathematics Achievement Score 
(n students=3,095; n classrooms =97; n teachers=77) 
 
  
CLASSROOM RANDOM EFFECTS 
(with Class Size and CLMOTHED 
constrained to the values of their 
estimates in Fitted Model 2c) 
  CLASSROOM RANDOM EFFECTS 
(Unconstrained Models) 




   CLMOTHED  (7.932)  (7.932)    16.154***  15.694*** 
   CLASSIZE  (23.919) (23.919)   -0.802  -1.033 
 
SCHOOL SECTOR (PRIVATE=1) 
 
   PRIVATE  -12.695*      -1.603   
 
TEACHER PREDICTORS   
Teacher Years of Experience   
   L_TEAXP  3.796  5.918*    0.097  0.327 
Teacher Level of Education (Licensure or EDLEVEL3 omitted category) 
   EDLEV1  -10.673  -11.842    -2.766  -2.840 
   EDLEV2  -23.592~  -27.053*    -2.345  -2.683 
   EDLEV4  -3.479  2.405    4.837
~ 5.438* 
   EDLEV5  5.107  3.233    -2.405  -2.838 




5.55 7.05    4.70 7.98~ 
 
Goodness of Fit 
R
2 “overall”  0.251  0.206    0.318  0.318 
~p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 









    
Figure 3 
Fitted Relationship between 5
th Grade Mathematics Achievement Score and 
Years of Teacher Experience for a Prototypical Student in a Classroom of Average Size 
and Average Peer-Group SES  
(from Model 4b) 
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Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A1 
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SAMPLE 2000 
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public) 
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Table  A1 




    MSCORE   Student mathematics achievement score on a standardized test administered at the 
end of 5
th grade (possible score range = 0 to 492 points). 
 
STUDENT-LEVEL CONTROL PREDICTORS 
   FORM  Dichotomous variable indicating test form (0 = Form B, 1= Form A) 
   PRETEST  Student achievement on a mathematics and language test administered at the end of 
4
th grade (possible score range = 0 to 306 points). 
   AGE  Student age at the end of the 5
th grade school year (years). 
   FEMALE  Dichotomous variable indicating student’s gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 
   MOTHED  Ordinal variable indicating mother’s educational level (0 = no education, 1 = 
incomplete primary, 2 = complete primary, 3 = incomplete secondary and, 4 = 
complete secondary and beyond). 
   MHH  Dichotomous variable indicating whether the student’s mother is the head of the 
household (0=no,1=yes) 
   DAYABS  Number of days that the student was absent from school in the last 2 weeks. 
   HWHELP  System of dummy variables that indicate the frequency with which the student 
receives help with homework at home (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = always).  In 
our analyses, HWHELP = 3 (always receives help) acts as the reference category.  
    BOOKS  PCA-based composite measure constructed from multiple indicators of the 
availability of books, story-books, and encyclopedias in a student’s home.  
Standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, with positive 
scores indicating better availability. 
 
CLASSROOM PEER-GROUP COMPOSITION and CLASS SIZE 
   CLMOTHED  “Leave-out” classroom average level of students’ mother’s education. 
   CLMEAN  “Leave-out” classroom mean score on the pretest. 












   EDLEVEL  Ordinal variable indicating the teacher’s maximum educational level (either 
obtained or in process of obtaining).  In our analyses, we converted this variable 
into a system of dichotomous (dummy) predictors, EDLEVEL1 through 
EDLEVEL5 (1 = Pedagogical high school, 2 = Educational Technology 3 = 
Licensure in Education, 4 = Postgraduate courses including Master’s degree or 
specialization in education, 5=other professional qualification).  EDLEVEL3 
(licensure) was omitted from our analyses as a reference category. 
   TEAEXP  Continuous variable indicating the total number of years that the teacher has been 
in the teaching profession. 
    SSCALE  Ordinal variable indicating the teacher’s step on the salary scale (1-14) 
  
SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS 
   PRIVATE  Dichotomous variable indicating whether the school is public or private (1 = 










    
 Table A2 
Estimated Regression Coefficients Associated with Control Predictors, by Model 
 
  






   Constant  296.312*** 296.546*** 296.546***296.586***296.572***296.027*** 295.945***296.091***
   FORM  -6.277***  -6.325*** -6.328***  -6.335*** -6.334*** -6.440*** -6.403*** -6.457*** 
      PRETEST  0.308*** 0.301***  0.302*** 0.302*** 0.303*** 0.329*** 0.314*** 0.310*** 
      PRETEST  SQ 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
   FEMALE  -8.172***  -8.180*** -8.160***  -8.145*** -8.140*** -7.358*** -8.125*** -8.160*** 
   AGE  -2.734***  -2.636*** -2.579***  -2.649*** -2.593*** -2.160**  -2.311**  -2.214** 
   AGE SQ  -0.841*  -0.896**  -0.906**  -0.885** -0.897** -1.003** -0.840*  -0.869* 
   DAYABS  -1.853***  -1.758*** -1.807***  -1.762*** -1.805*** -1.939*** -1.888*** -1.832*** 
      MHH  4.626*** 4.371***  4.385*** 4.395*** 4.399*** 4.521*** 4.730*** 4.702*** 
      BOOKS  2.395*** 2.479***  2.453*** 2.465*** 2.446*** 2.693*** 2.363*** 2.404*** 
      HWHELP1  7.734** 7.735**  7.792** 7.672** 7.745** 7.650** 7.695** 7.626** 
      HWHELP2  7.600*** 7.627***  7.592*** 7.528*** 7.526*** 7.374*** 7.503*** 7.463*** 
      MOTHED  0.512 0.606  0.579 0.936 0.796 1.868**  0.991 0.974 
   Model 3a  Model 3b Model 3c  Model 3d Model 4a Model 4b  Model 4c  Model 4d
   Constant  292.310*** 295.540*** 298.140***300.424*** 292.056***277.394*** 295.328***293.681***
   FORM  -6.782***  -6.447*** -6.401*** -6.359*** -6.353*** -6.351*** -6.389*** -6.392***
   PRETEST    0.329*** 0.318*** 0.313*** 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 
   PRETEST SQ    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
   FEMALE    -7.307*** -8.094*** -7.665*** -7.809*** -7.882*** -8.512*** -8.524***
   AGE    -2.134** -2.343*** -2.517*** -2.570*** -2.561*** -2.417*** -2.400***
   AGE SQ    -1.005** -0.873** -0.922** -0.898** -0.883**  -0.827*  -0.826* 
   DAYABS    -1.938*** -1.896*** -1.866*** -1.860*** -1.865*** -1.894*** -1.899***
   MHH    4.517*** 4.660*** 4.413*** 4.469*** 4.426*** 4.801*** 4.824*** 
   BOOKS    2.683*** 2.456*** 2.460*** 2.442*** 2.405*** 2.388*** 2.381*** 
   HWHELP1    7.603** 7.854** 7.697** 7.707** 7.662** 8.044** 8.024** 
   HWHELP2    7.348*** 7.577*** 7.531*** 7.568*** 7.544*** 7.712*** 7.695*** 
   MOTHED     1.850*  1.244~  1.044 0.998 0.899 1.055 1.042 















Plot Displaying the Fitted Relationship between Students’ 5
th Grade Mathematics 
Achievement Score and Class Size,  
for a Prototypical Student in a Classroom of Average Peer-Group SES  
(Based on Model 2c) 
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